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The boom and bust of the Texas  construction  sector  is well known, yet its causes  and
effects are less  well understood. At first glance  the rise and fall of the Texas  construction
sector  seems  to have followed the movements  in oil prices.  However, a closer look at the
data  suggests  that there may have  been  other factors which exacerbated  the effects that oil
price swings  had on the construction  industry.  Of particular interest  are the effects of tle  tax
law changes  in 1981  and 1986  which made  real estate  investing  more lucrative in the first
half of the decade. In this article we attempt  to determine  how much of an impact such
factors  had on the excessive  buildup and subsequent  crash  of tle  Texas  construction  industry.
We use a vector-autoregressive  (VAR) model to analyze  the roles tax laws, interest  rates  and
oil prices played in the movements  of both residential  and nonresidential  construction  in
lexas-.
rWe thank Nathan  Balke, Michael Boldin, Steve  Brown, Chih-Ping Chang, Bill  Gilmer
and [.ori Taylor for their helpful suggestions  and comments. We also offer thanks  to Dixie
Blackley and James  Follain for generously  sharing  their data. The views expressed  in the
paper  are the authors' and do not necessarily  reflect those  of the Federal  Reserve  Bank of
Dallas or the Federal  Reserve  System.
2In this article, we do not examine  nonbuilding  corstruction, which includes  roads,
highways  and sewer  systems. Data for this series  were unavailable.BACKGROUND:  TIm  BOOM AND BUST OF TIIE  TEXAS CONSTRUCTION
SECTOR
The Texas  construction  boom began  in the mid-1970s  and continued  for alrnost  ten
years  (Chart 1).  At flrst, the strength  in construction  activity  seemed  justified by economic
fundamentals. Between  earLy  1974  and early 1981, inflation-adjusted  oil prices nearly tripled
and the Texas  economy  expanded  rapidly (Chart 2).  During this period, nonresidential
cofftruction  activity more than quadrupled,  while offlce vacancy  rates  tightened.
In  1982,  however, the construction  sector  diverged  from the rest of the economy.
While oil prices fell and the Texas  and U.S. economies  turned downward, Texas  construction
activity -especially residential  construction--  surged  (Chart 3).  Throughout  the mid-1980s,
the high level of construction  activity did not seem  to be supported  by the Texas  economy's
weak growth.  Although declining interest  rates  may have motivated  some  construction
activlty, the amount  of space  added  during this'period far exceeded  the demand,  as shown  by
the rising vacancy  rates  for all types  of real estate  (Table 1).
In 1986, a plunge in oil prices and a sharp  recession  in tie  Texas  economy  helped
push an already weakening  construction  sector  into a prolonged  decline.  While construction
accounted  for only 6.7 percent  of employment,  it accounted for 40 percent  of the job decline
in 1986,  or almost  100,000  jobs.  By 1987,  the  Texas  economy  was  on the  upswing  again
and  oil prices  had  stabilized,  but the state's  construction  sector  remained  extremely  weak.
Not until the  early 1990s  did Texas  see  a rebound  in construction  activity, and  even  today,
construction  activity  in Texas  remains  well below  the levels  of the  early 1980s.
As the  previous  discussion  suggests,  oil prices  seem  to have  been  an important  factorin the boom and bust of the Texas  construction  sector. Recent  shrdies  suggest  that tax policy
changes  may have also been  responsible  for some  of the volatility in certain segments  of the
construction  industry, namely  the multifamily and nonresidential  sectors. The data supports
zuch a view.  As Chart I  shows,  dramatic  movements  in residential  and nonresidential
building pennit values  occurred  after major changes  in tax policy in 1981  and 1986. Browne
and Case  (1992) show that The Economic  Recovery  Tax Act of 1981  (ERTA) favored real
estat€  over other investments,  boosting  construction  of nonresidential  properties  in the early
1980s. Brueggeman,  Fisher and Stern  (1982) find that ERTA boosted  invesunent
multifamily housing  during the same  time period.
Several  other papers  shed  light on the impact of the 1986  Tax Refonn Act (TRA) on
certain types  of real estate. Work by Follain, I-eavens  and Velz (1993), DiPasquale  and
Wheaton  (1992), and Poterba  (1990) finds a significant negative  impact of TRA on
multifamily construction. TRA's impact on nonresidential  consffuction  is less  clear
according  to Follain, Hendershott  and Ling (1992) and Browne and Case  (1992).  These
studies  show that the overbuilding of the 1980s  may have swamped  the long-run effects of
TRA on tle  nonresidential  sector. The authors  argue  that other factors --such  as easier
credit-  likely contributed  to the mid-1980s  overbuilding.
The volatility in multifamily construction  may have  been  even stronger  in Texas.
Follain, kavens and  Velz (1993)  note  that  while the passage  of the Tax Reform  Act of 1986
caused  a large decline in multifamily construction  across  the nation, the decline  was much
larger in Dallas than in other cities and began  before the passage  of the 1986  law.  The
authors  suggest  that this may be a result of unrealized  oil price expectations. As chart 1shows,  multifamily constf,uction  in Texas  ballooned  in the early 1980s,  and virnrally
disappeared  in 1987. We believe  that the buildup and eventual  drop-off was likely due to a
combination  of factors such  as the oil boom and bust, oil price expectations,  tax law changes,
interest  rates, financial deregulation  and fraud.  In this paper, we attempt  to deterrnine  how
much of this impact was due to factors such  as tax law and hterest rate changes.
FOLICY  CHANGES
Provisions of ERTA which may have led to the construction boom
The passage  of the Economic  Recovery  Tax Act of 1981  may have boosted
construction  beyond  what could be supported  by the underlying demand. In an effort to
stimulate  investrnent,  the act created  significant tax brealc for investors  in income  -generating
properties, such  as aparfinents  and office buildings.  The most noteworthy  elements  in ERTA
centered  around  methods  of depreciation  and capital recovery  periods.
Under the new law, tax lifetimes of rcal estate  properties  other than single-family
housing  were significantly reduced. For example,  ERTA shortened  the tax lifetime for
residential  rcntal property from 32 to 15 years. This change  had the effect of reducing  the
effective tax rate on the lifetime income  generated  by the property and allowed for
accelerated  recovery  of invesUnents.  The tax law was especially  attractive  to high-income
investors  who could invest in real estate  through a limited parmership  and  use any losses  to
shelter  taxes  on other  income. In addition,  commercial  properties  could  be resold  and
depreciated  several  times  --or "churned"--  which increased  the incentive  to invest  in real
estate.
4Provisions of TRA that may have led to the construction bust
While several  factors  may have  initiated the Texas  construction  bust, the Tax Reform
Act of 1986  was a major catalyst. TRA removed  the tax depreciation  advantages  given to
real estate  investors  five years  earlier by extending  the tax lifetime for income-producing  real
estate,  and requiring straight-line  depreciation. This method  replaced  the more accelerated
175  percent  declining-balance  method  used  under ERTA.  These  changes  significantly
reduced  the tax savings  generated  by depreciation  allowances  to real estale  investorr.
In addition, the 1986  act eliminated  the distinction between  capital gains  and other
types  of income  and raised  tle  top capital gaiff  tax rate to 28 percent. It elimilrated  ttre tax
exemption  for capital gains  on income-producing  property (a large part of the retums on
property investments  are capital gains). The higher capital gairs rate in 1986  furttrer
magnified the reduction in depreciation  tax benefits.
TRA also  included  several  provisions  designed  to restrict  tax shelter  investment.
Passive-loss  limitations were enacted  which disallowed  income  tax deductions  from active
income  for net losses  of passive  income, such  as limited partnership  invesfinent. Passive-loss
limitations likely had the largest  impact on multifamity real estate,  which had benefited
greatly from limited partnership  deals  under ERTA.
Easy  credit
Follain, kavens, and  Velz (1993)  and  Browne  and  Case  (1992)  suggest  that  the
buildup of real estate  in the 1980s  may have  been  exacerbated  by what some  have  identified
as  a "lending  frenzy".  In the  early 1980s,  when  tax law changes  made  real  estate  investingmore profitable, several  events  occurred  that gave financial institutions a larger pool of
available  funds to lend to real estate  investors. The Depository Instinrtions  Deregulation  and
Monetary Control Act of 1980  accelerated  the deregulation  of deposit  interest  rates  by
providing an eventual  phase-out  of interest  rate ceilings on deposits  of banks  and thrift
instinrtions. The act also  broadened  the lending powers  of federally chartered  thriffs.  In
addition, the Garn-St  Gerrnain  Depository  Institution Act of  1982  created  a new account,  the
money market deposit  account,  and as these  accounts  became  available, a flood of money
poured into them.3 Meanwhile, a monetary  easing  initiated a decline in interest  rates  aod
added  to banks' liquidity.
The increase  of available  funds and the purzuit of real estate  lending by thrifts and
commercial  banks  may have  led to the financing of income-producing  real estate  to a point of
oversupply. For instanc€,  in Texas, although  aparfrnent  vacancy  rates  rose rapidly during the
during the period 1981-83,  Texas  apartment  co'nstruction  morc than tripled.  Texas  lending
instinrtions  that had been  badly burned  by energy loans  were searching  for different
investments,  and they chose  real estate.  Hence,  the lending frenzy may have  been  even
more pronounced  in Texas  than elsewhere  in the country.
EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS
Model
To examine  the relatiorship between  the construction  sector  and other variables,  we
employed  a VAR methodology,  where lagged  values  of the dependent  variables  are used  as
6
rSpong  (1990).explanatory  variables. We studied  the interrelationships  between  the regional construction
sector, interest  rate and tax law changes,  the overall regional economy,  oil prices, and the
national business  cycle.  The VAR methodology  allows for external  factors such  as interest
rates  and tax laws to affect construction  independently  of changes  in the state's  economy.
We used  variance  decomposition  to measure  the impact that shocks  to the different
variables  had on the Texas  construction  sector  and vice versa. Variance  decomposition
apportions  the variance  of forecast  errors in a given variable to shocks  to itself and shocks  to
the other variables. The method  we used  to calculate  the variance  decomposition  is the
Choleski decomposition,  which decomposes  the residuals  (p) into sets  of impulses  that are
.orthogonal  to each  other (r).  Orthogonalization  takes  the covariance  between  the residuals
into account. If  the covariance  between  the residuals  is sufficiently high, the ordering of the
dependent  variables  can affect the resultsa. The structure  we employed  for the variables  is
specified  such  that it allows a one-way  contemporaneous  relationship  between  tle
construction  variables  and Texas  economic  activitv variables. The structure  is as follows:
Foit  :  loir (l)
aln general, the covariance between the residuals in the VAR  were small.  In the
few cases  wherc the Pearson  correlation coefficient was statistically significant there was
economic justification  for the ordering of the equations.  For example, the correlations
between  the shocks  to the U.S. and Texas  economies  were particularly  high,  but it was
reasonable to assume  that the shocks  were transfered  from the nation to Texas rather
than the opposite. In one instance,  however,  the direction was  not as clear. Because  the
policy variable is measured in present value terms it is affected by interest rate changes,
thus the ordering of these two variables is unclear.  Because  of this uncertainty and a
statistically significant corrclation  in the errors of the two equations, we reversed  the
order of the two equations. We found that changing the order of the policy variable and
the interest rate had no significant impact on the results.LLaw  :  cztlton  'l-  va*
/rint :  Crrlroir +  %zFa*  *  z,n,
Fw  :  Ett4oit I  Cezl/,,aq  *  c43;.r;n  *  zu,
lru  :  Cst  trto  't  Cszlr@  -F Csrlri,,t  +  Cs4p* +  /u






where (a/)  is refiner's acquisition  cost, adjusted  for inflation,  (inr) is a ten-year  utility  bond
rate minus expected  inflations  ,  (dep) is the present  value of the tax savings  generated  by
depreciation  allowances  (from Follain, kavens, and  Velz, 1993),  (ru) is-U.S.  personal
income  minus Texas  personal  income  and is used  as the measure  of U.S. economic  activity,
and (ft),  the measure  of Texas  economic  activity, is Texas  personal  income.6 We use
quarterly data spanning  the years 1976-90. All  variables  are expressed  in dollars and are
deflated  by the U.S. consumer  pricc index.
To capture  the different types  of Texas  construction  activity, we used  single-family
(.V?v),  multifamny @fpv), and nonresidential  (nrespv)  permit values, as this data is the most
consistent  across  the differcnt types  of residential  and nomesidential  corstruction activity.  A
separate  system  of equations  was estimated  for each  of these  tl[ee  different meazures  of
Texas  construction  activity.  The variable (cozs) refers to the construction  measure  used  in
5The  expected  inflation  rate  is a ten-year  expected  inflation  series  based  on a survey  of
economists,  prepared  by the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Philadelphia.
6We  also  used  total  nonagricultural  employment  as  a measure  of U.S. and  Texas
economic  activity  to analyze  the sensitivity  of results  to the  measure  of economic  activity
employed. The  results  were  not qualitatively  different.each  system  of equations.
In equations  1 through 6,  p,  represents  the current innovation  in variable i and  the
irnovation process  ,, is assumed  to be orthogonal. An innovation is a shock, or a change  in
a given variable that is not anticipated  by the model.  The above  strucfi[e implies that
unexpected  changes  in oil prices do not contemporaneously  arise from any of our specified
variables. Innovations  in oil prices, depreciation  rates, and intercst  rates  affect the
innovations  in the U.S. economy  contemporaneously,  but the U.S. economy  does  not affect
these  variables  contemporaneously.  Current innovations  in the Texas  economy  variables  are
affected  by current innovations  in oil prices, depreciation  rates, interest  rates, and the U.S.
economy  variables  but not the construction  variables. Although innovations  in the
construction  variables  affect the Texas  economy  variables,  they are not contemporaneous--
they work their effects through the system  over time.
To examine  the long-run dynamics  of the shocks  to construction  we calculated
impulse  response  functions. The impulse  response  function traces  over time the effects  on a
variable of a given shock  to another  variable.  The persistence  of a shock  tells us how fast
the system  adjusts  back to equilibrium.  The faster a shock  dampens,  the faster the
adjushnent. The Choleski decomposition  was used  to calculate  the impulse  response
functions.  We analyzed  the effects of a one-time, one standard-deviation  shock  to the first
difference of each  variable.  We then traced  the effects of this shock  on each  of the
variables.
9Diagnostic checks
Prior to estimating  the VARs, we performed  several  diagnostic  checks  to assess  the
correct specification  for the various series. We tested  for stationarity  using Dickey-Fuller
tests  and found that all of the series  are integrated  of order of one.  Thus, the first
differences  of the series  are stationary  and any shock  to the series  is permanent.
We also checked  for cointegration  in the three systems  of equatiors in which each
system  is distinguished  by a different construction  variable and found cointegration  in all
three systems. We accounted  for cointegration  by specifying an error-correction  model in
which changes  in the dependent  variable  are explained  by past changes  in both the
independent  and dependent  variables  plus an error-correction  term.7 The error-correction
term specifies  the adjusunent  to deviations  from the long-run equilibrium relationship.
RESULTS
Variance decomposition results
Our rcsults show  that tax policy indeed  played a significant role in the volatility of the
Texas  construction  industry -especially the income-producing  sectors--  during the 1970s  and
1980s. The  variance  decomposition  results  show  that  the changes  in tax laws  in the 1980s
had a significant impact on multifamily construction  and, to a lesser  degree,  on
nonresidential  construction. Tax policy had a very slight effect on single-family
construction,  however  this sector  responded  strongly to changes  in interest  rates.
The  two major  tax laws  enacted  in the 1980s,  ERTA and  TRA, affected  income-
'Engle  and  Granger  (1987).
10producing rcal estate  by changing  depreciation  schedules  and  capital rccovery periods.
Multi-family  construction  was strongly impacted  by changes  in the tax policy variable.
Although oil prices and the Texas  economy  had the largest  effects on this sector,  tax policy
changes  accounted  for I2.2 percent  of ttrc forecast  error variance  in the multifamily sector
from 1976  to 1990. These  results  are consistent  with the predictiors of Follain, et al. (1987)
that multifamily construction,  which had benefitted  from ERTA, would decline zubstantially
after TRA.
Our results indicate  tlat  tax policy also  played a significant role in the volatility of
nonresidential  construction  in Texas,  a result that other studies  have not been  able to identiff.
As in multifamily construction,  oil price shocls were the major cause  of volatility in the
nonresidential  construction  sector. Innovations  in oil prices explained  57 percent  of the
forecast  variance  in nonresidential  construction. Tax policy shocks  u/ere  secondary  to oil
price shocks  and explained  7.1 percent  of the volatility of the nonresidential  sector. These
results  arc consistent  with the view that oil price shocks  inlluenced investors' expectations
about  futurc growth in the Texas  economy. These  expectations  were likely the strongest
impetus  to build nonresidential  property such  as industrial warehouses  and office buildings in
the early 1980's.
Changes  in tax policy had a slight affect on single-family construction,  accounting  for
only I  percent  of the volatility in this sector. ERTA and TRA affected  single-family housrng
by lowering personal  income  tax rates  which reduced  the value of homeowners'  deductions
for mortgage  interest  payments  and property taxes.  However, these  effects were small and
were dwarfed by the effects of interest  rates  changes.
l1lrng-term  interest  rates  played a large role in the volatility of the single-family
housing  sector. As Table 2 shows,  while shocks  to long-term real interest  rates  generally
were important for all consffuction  sectors,  they accounted  for 34.4 percent  of the forecast
error variance  in single-family construction. This is likely because  residential  borrowers
have limited sources  of financing (such  as savings  and loans, mortgage  companies,  anc
banks), and swings  in real interest  rates  can have a large impact on the number  of individuals
qualified to borrow.
Finally, much of the source  of volatility in the three different construction  sectors  is
explained  by shocla to the sectors  themselves. This implies that much of the movements  in
these  sectors  is unexplained  by the other variables  included in the models. Factors  zuch  as
frauds  and the "lending frenzy" suggested  by other researchers  may have  had an important
impact on construction  during this period.
Impulse response  results
An impulse  response  function describes  the pattern  and duration of the response  of a
given variable to a one standard  deviation shock in another  variable.  We find that changes  in
the tax variable lead to very persistent  responses  for all types  of construction.
"The most famous  case  of fraud was the I-30 condominium  scandal  in the Dallas area.
More than  100  people  were  convicted  in the case,  including  developers,  bankers,  appraisers
and  investors.  At the  core  of the scheme  were  land  flips in which a series  of quick  sales  of a
piece  of property  among  interrelated  buyers  artificially drove  up the  price  to as  much  as  10
times  its original  price. The  scheme  was  based  on a phony  condominium  sales  boom.
Several  dozen  large  condominium  developments,  involving  hundreds  of units, were  started
and  many  were  left incomplete  or vacant  and  evenfl.rally  tom down. The  scheme  involved
more  than  $300  million in loans,  most  based  on false  appraisals.  Five thrifts involved  in the
scheme  eventually  failed.
t2Our results  show that a shock  to the tax policy variable has  a generally  positive but
unstable  effect on multifamily construction. The effect of a tax policy shock is very
persistent  and shows  little sign of dying out even  after 30 quarters. However, multifamily
construction  also has an unstable  respon$e  to shocks  in each  of the other variables  in the
model.  This general  instability in the multifamily sector  responses  is likely due to the
unusual  pattern of multifamily construction  activity in the period under shrdy.
As shown in Table 1 and Chart 2, a surge  in multifarnily construction  in the early
1980s  caused  the vacancy  rate for rental housing  to double  and, combined  with economic
weakness  in the mid-1980s,  resulted  in aknost  no new multifamily construction  from 1987  to
1992. Thus the data suggests  that the factors which influenced  the decline in multifamily
construction  from 1984  to 1987  had very longJasting  effects. As mentioned  earlier,
however, at least  part of the overbuilding in the early 1980s  could be attributed  to the
"lending frenzy  " and fraud.  It is hard to quantify the fraction of overbuilding due to thes€
factors, but it is likely that they had an important impact on the recovery  time in this sector
and ttrus on our measured  impulse  responses.
ln the case  of nonresidential  construction,  the response  to an increase  in the tax
variable is negative. This means  that an increase  in the savings  from depreciation  leads  to
lower levels of nonresidential  construction. Others  studies  such  as Browne and Case  (1992)
obtain similar results  and suggest  that changes  in depreciation  rules were offset by the
reduction in the corporate  income  tax rate.  Follain, Hendershott  and Ling (1992) suggest
that  overbuilding  in the  middle 1980s,  swamps  the  results  of the long-run  effect  of the 1986
tax act  on nonresidential  construction.
IJAn incrcase  in the tax policy variable rczults in increased  single-family construction
activity.  Although the tax policy variable as specified  in our model does  not directly pertain
to single-family housing, it affects  this sector  indirectly.  An increase  in tax savings
generated  by depreciation  allowances  leads  to increased  multifamily housing  construction.
The pick-up in economic  activity because  of increased  construction  likely leads  to furcreased
demand  for single-family housing, thus generating  the positive response  to the tax variable.
The response  of single-family housing  to an increase  in the interest  rate is negative  as
expected.
The estimated  positive response  of single-family construction  to a.tax policy shock
peaks  in the fust quarter  after the shock  and persists  for roughly tlree quarters,  suggesting
that a tax policy shock  works its way through the single-family sector  in 9 months. lnterest
rate shocks  are less  persistent  and  work their way through the single-family construction
sector  in about  2 quarters
CONCLUSION
While factors related  to the Texas  economy,  such  as oil prices, played  a major role in
the volatility of the Texas  construction  sector  over the past twenty years, tax policy and
intercst  rates  were also significant factors in the escalation  and eventual  downfall of the
Texas  construction  sector. Tax policy had  a significant  impact  on multifamily  and
nonresidential  construction  while interest  rates  were the most important factor for the single-
family housing  sector.
We also  find, however,  that  between  20 percent  and  50 percent  of the  shocks  to the
14Texas  constnrction  sectors  were not explained  by shocks  to the interest  rate, tax laws, oil
prices, Texas  personal  income, or U.S. personal  income. This finding leaves  room for other
explanations  for the large swings  in construction,  such  as the lending frenzy theory proposed
by some  economists,  as well as fraud that took place in the rcal estate  industry in Texas
during the 1980s.
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16TABLE  1.  VACANCY  RATES
Rental  Housinq
Pencent
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
5.0 5.3 5.7 5.9 6.s 7.3 7.7 7.7 7.4 7.2
5.4 4.7 9.0 7.7  73.9  n.2 76.211.9  14.6  r2.3
6.4 7.613.9  15.4  18.1  18.0  18.3  14.4  I2.5 9.6
United  States








1.5 1.5 t.7  t.7  1.6 r.7  1.6 1.8 1.7
1.4 2.0 2.2 1.6 2.1 3.7 3.9 4.1 2.I
4.1 3.4 5.4 3.6 3.7 3.4 2.3 2.4 2.1
Office - Downtown  Aneas
United  States






4.8  10.3  72.4  14.7  16.5  16.4  16.3  16.216.7  17.I
4.8  10.0  14.6  17.2  77.5  2r.6  24.5  23.5  22.4  24.7
1.3 5.8  14.6  20.9  20.2  20.0  2t.9  19.4  18.5  77.7
3.8 4.8 4.9 4.7 5.0  5.8 5.5  6.0 6.4 7.4
8.1 7.3 6.9 4.6  6.1 7.0 6.9 8.4  7.2 B.B
5.7 4.6 5.6 7  .1 14.t 14.9  12.7 9  .6  9.8 9.3
S0URCE:  Taken  from  Browne  (1992,  37).  Indlrect  sounces:  Housinq--U.S.
Bureau  of the  Census:  office  and  industrial  --ColdwelI  Banker.
1"7TABLE  2.  SOURCES  OF  LONG.RUN  FORECAST  ERROR  VARIANCE  IN CONSTRUCTION
VARTABLES  (1976-90)
NRESPV MFPV SFPV
OIL 56.9t 31.  ig
DEP 7  .1, 12.2 1.1
INT 7.2 10.3 34.4
US 6.9 4.3 0.7
TX 0.3 14.8 L-+
c0Ns 2t.5 ?7  .2 54.2
Each  col  umn  shows  the  sounce  of variance  for.  the  resoective  constnuction
vaniable  used  in the  mode.l  .  The  variable  C0NS  r"eferi  to the  construction
sector  listed at the  top  of the  column.,  For  example,  the  finst column  shows
that 21  .5 percent  of the  fonecast  erron  variance  in nonresidential
construction  was  due  to shocks  in itself.
18TABLE  3.  SOURCES  OF  LONG.RUN  FORECAST  ERROR  VARIANCE  IN THE  TEXAS  ECONOMY
r976-90
NRESPV MFPV SFPV
OIL 40.9t 28.9t 16.  09
DEP 4.6 10  .4 q0
INT 13.9 9.7 0.8
US 34.4 2t.7 L9.4
TX 1.8 17  .9 0.8
coNs 4.3 11.5 54.0
Each  column  shows  the sounce  of vaniance  for Texas  personal  .i  ncome  for the
three  diffenent  construction  var  iables  used  in the inodel  .  For  examole.  the
fi t'st column  shows  that 40.9  per.cent  of the forecasL  error variance'  in Texas
personal  income  was  due  to shocks  to oi1 prices  when  nonresidential  per-mi  t
va  lues  are used  as the constnuction  variable. The  variable  C0NS  refens  to the
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